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HOLD THE CORKS: A COMMENT ON PAUL
CARRINGTON'S "SUBSTANCE" AND
"PROCEDURE" IN THE RULES
ENABLING ACT
STEPHEN B. BURBANK*

This problem at first approach seems difficult. The Advisory Committee found very little difficulty with it. It is astonishing how many decisions there are in the Supreme Court and the other courts which define
the difference between procedure, on the one hand, and substantive
rights, on the other.
William D. Mitchell, Chairman of the original Advisory Committee, to the participants in the Cleveland Institute on the Federal
Rules (1938).
I frequently am dissatisfied with myself, because after more than
two years of struggling with practice and procedure, when a question
arises as to whether a matter is procedure or substance, my mind is
murky on the subject and I am unable to reach a conclusion in which I
have confidence whenever the question is at all debatable. The truth is
that the twilight zone around the dividing line between substance and
procedure is a very broad one. If it were not for the fact that the court
which makes these rules will decide whether they were within the authority, we would have very serious difficulties in dealing with this
problem. The general policy I have acted on is that where a difficult
question arose as to whether a matter was substance or procedure and
Copyright @ 1990 by Stephen B. Burbank
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., 1968; J.D., 1973, Harvard University.
As a result of my articles on the Enabling Acts and court rulemaking, I appeared as an invited
witness at hearings on, and otherwise assisted the House Judiciary Committee in developing amendments to, those statutes. See, eg., Rules EnablingAct of 1985: Hearingon H.R. 2633 andH.R. 3550
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-48, 90-93, 280-82 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Hearing];
131 CONG.REc. Hl1,398 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1985) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (thanking author
for assisting the Committee on the bill); see also infra note 127. I also testified in Senate hearings,
which were limited to the issue of supersession. See Prepared Statement of Stephen B. Burbank
Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
on the Rules Enabling Acts (May 25, 1988) (copy available from author). In preparing this comment, I have benefited from reading an unpublished manuscript by Laura Macklin. L. Macklin,
Federal Court Rulemaking (1989). I also have benefited from comments by David Beier, Frank
Goodman, Leo Levin, Laura Macklin, and Steve Subrin.
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I thought the proposed provision was a good one, I have voted to put it
in, on the theory that if the Court adopted it, the Court would be likely
to hold, if the question ever arises in litigation, that the matter is a
procedural one.
William D. Mitchell to the Hon. George Wharton Pepper, a
member of the Advisory Committee (December 19, 1937).

In a recent article in this journal, Paul Carrington offered a comprehensive statement of his views about the proper function of, including the
legal and prudential limits on, court rules promulgated by the Supreme

Court for application in the lower federal courts.1 First presented when
Professor Carrington was concluding service as a Dean and beginning
service as Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 2 the paper has evolved both in its reach and in the confidence of its conclusions.
The changes reflect the enhanced time available to the author and his
enduring appetite for education. They also reflect his participation in the
recently revived, and surprisingly vigorous, debate about the future of
American civil procedure. Indeed, Professor Carrington has assumed
the role of chief defender of what he represents as the status quo: a system of uniform and trans-substantive national rules, loosely textured and
relying to a great extent on judicial discretion. In his view, such a system, by preserving the appearance of political neutrality, allows the
rulemakers ("technicians") to go about their business without the distractions of interest group politics and yields results that should be a
3
source of satisfaction to all.
In his most recent article, for the first time, Professor Carrington
confronts issues of rulemaking power. Having assisted, albeit in an "obscure and muffled" 4 way, in a successful campaign to defeat repeal of the

1. See Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure"in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J.
281 (1989).
2. Dean Carrington presented a paper entitled, "An Appreciation of Walter Wheeler Cook,
Erie, and the Rules Enabling Act," to the Section of Civil Procedure of the Association of American
Law Schools on January 7, 1988. I was privileged to comment on that paper, as well as a paper by
Judge Jack Weinstein. See Burbank, The Chancellor'sBoot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REv. 31 (1988). This
Comment is a revised version of my AALS remarks.
3. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 301-02, 303-07, 326-27; Carrington, Continuing Work on
the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 733 (1988); Carrington, Making Rules to
Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2067, 2074-85 (1989) [hereinafter Carrington, Bogy).
See also Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,73 JUDICATURE 4 (1989)

4. Carrington, supra note 1, at 281.
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supersession clause by Congress, 5 the author would like us to join in celebrating that event 6 and to rest assured that-in matters of power as in
other matters of rulemaking jurisprudence-all is, if not well, then at
least well enough not to worry.7
Neither deans nor reporters have tenure, which should make us
doubly happy that Paul Carrington is also a professor. The qualities he
has brought to the position of Reporter of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules-independence of mind, receptivity to other points of view,

and the awareness that rulemaking is in an important sense a political
5. Compare Letter from Janet Napolitano, Esq. to Professor Paul Carrington 1-2 (May 13,
1987) (copy available from author) ("I have been more than tardy in response to your letter raising
questions about the proposed amendments to the Rules Enabling Act .... If any active opposition is
to be garnered, that work needs to be done in the Senate. Senator DeConcini ...might be helpful to
us in this regard if we ask him to be.") with Statement of Paul Carrington to Subcommittee on
Courts and Administrative Practice of Senate Judiciary Committee Re: Proposed Deletion of Supersession Provision by the Rules Enabling Act Amendments of 1988, at 1-2 (May 25, 1988) (copy
available from author) ("I will not draw any conclusion on the wisdom of the proposed revision, in
part because I serve the Judicial Conference of the United States, which has voted to take no position
with respect to the issue, and also because my own individual opinion, which is all that I could
provide, should have no particular weight in your deliberations, especially so because I may be
perceived to have a personal interest in the matter.").
In fact, the Conference did take a position on the proposed deletion of the supersession clause,
namely the position of "no objection." As explained in a letter from Judge Gignoux, then Chairman
of the Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, to Representative Kastenmeier,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee:
The Conference defers to your view that the supersession clause is probably unnecessary
since the Judicial Code of 1948 eliminated the numerous federal procedural statutes which
were the principal reason for the clause. The Conference also is persuaded that it would be
unwise to invite litigation challenging the rulemaking process by those who question the
constitutionality of a supersession clause under the Separation of Powers doctrine.
Letter from Hon. Edward T. Gignoux to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier 1 (Sept. 24, 1985), reprinted
in H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985); see also Prepared Statement of Joseph F.
Weis Jr., Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference, Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice, Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, on the Rules Enabling Act of 1987, at 1 (May 25, 1988) [hereinafter Weis
Statement] (copy available from author) ("the Conference does not object to the bill's provisions on
this subject").
As amended by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 401, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-49 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 2072 provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including
proceedings before magistrates thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
The second sentence of section 2072(b) contains the so-called "supersession clause." For further
discussion of the history of its preservation against the House's attempt at repeal, see infra text
accompanying notes 178-79.
6. "Supersession lives! Long live Supersession!" Carrington, supra note 1, at 281. I had
thought of entitling this Comment, after Cato the Elder, "Supersession Must Be Destroyed." Cf.II
PLUTARCH'S LivEs 383 (Loeb ed. 1914) ("Carthage must be destroyed"). Professor Carrington's
article is, however, about much more than supersession, and so is this response.
7. See, eg., Carrington, supra note 1, at 326-27.
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enterprise-are badly needed in that enterprise.8 Indeed, because Professor Carrington is the Reporter, we have less reason to be worried about
one kind of judicial usurpation. His article reflects attention to issues
implicating the allocation of federal powers and to the relativity of legal
language that, in this context at least, was disdained by Charles Clark as
it was by others among Professor Carrington's predecessors. 9 From its
rich and subtle analysis of limitations law 0 to its ingenious interpretation
of the Enabling Act's supersession clause, 1 the article is a fitting tribute
to the memory of Walter Wheeler Cook. 12 Nonetheless, I believe that
Professor Carrington has invited us to the wrong celebration and that
there is reason to doubt whether any celebration is in order. Having engaged Professor Carrington's views on generalism, judicial discretion and
political neutrality elsewhere,' 3 I find his views on rulemaking power no
more analytically satisfying, no more faithful to the facts, and no more
reassuring.
Professor Carrington attempts to demonstrate that, whatever the intent of Congress when it passed the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,14 the
Supreme Court has promulgated a number of Federal Rules that regulate
aspects of limitations law, either by their terms or by reason of the
Court's interpretations. Although at times critical of some of these decisions, Professor Carrington at other times embraces them as authority
for prospective rulemaking in the area, the propriety of which he belives
is confirmed by functional analysis.
In fact, as I shall demonstrate, Professor Carrington misreads both a
number of the Federal Rules and a number of the Court's decisions on
which he relies. Moreover, even if it were true, which it is not, that the
Court's fumbles in the limitations game somehow reached the end zone
of normative (or functional) thinking, that hardly would prove that the
Court can score in more important games, or that it can score at all when
8. See, eg., Burbank, Proposalsto Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REP. 425, 426-31 (1986) (arguing that formal legal analysis and the politics of court rulemaking
suggest that the Advisory Committee's basic premises are faulty).
9. See Burbank, The Rules EnablingAct of.1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1136-37, 1159-60
& n.620 (1982).
10. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 290-93.
11. See id. at 324-25.
12. See supra note 2.
13. See Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, FederalRules and Common
Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 693 (1988) [hereinafter Burbank, Rules and Discretion]; Burbank,
The Transformation of American Civil Procedure" The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1925 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Transformation].
14. Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934)(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982), amended by
Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4648 (1988)). The text of the Act, as codified and amended
prior to 1988, is set forth infra at note 115.
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it plays by the rules. Perhaps, however, unlike Professor Carrington, the

Court will realize that the referee already has blown the whistle.
Although those responsible for drafting and explaining the bill that

became the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were not legal realists, 15 their
understanding of "practice and procedure" as used in that bill was informed by the particular legal context in which they labored. Their primary purpose was to allocate power between the Supreme Court-as
rulemaker-and Congress, 16 with the new allocation restoring to the

Court prospective control of procedure in actions at law that it had long
held but never exercised, and that had been effectively withdrawn by the

Conformity Act of 1872.17 In response to examples carefully chosen by
the chief opponent of the bill, Senator Walsh, its supporters readily acknowledged that what might be deemed "practice and procedure" for
other purposes was not within the bill's grant of power to the Supreme
Court to make law prospectively-to act like a legislature. The most

18
prominent of Senator Walsh's examples was limitations law.
.In the light of the Enabling Act's history, and even without it, the

two dominant approaches to the Act-the Court's 19 and Professor
Ely's 2 0-are both flawed as exercises in interpretation and in their capacity to serve us well in the future. In each case, preoccupation with Erie

RailroadCo. v. Tompkins, 21 its progeny and its baggage has been a major
problem. Put another way, both the Court and Professor Ely failed to

heed Walter Wheeler Cook's teaching. So, I believe, has Professor
Carrington.
From 1941 until 1965 the Court was willing to acknowledge only
those restrictions on its rulemaking power that the prevailing Erie jurisprudence set for its power to displace state law by federal judge-made
rules (federal common law). 22 In Hanna v. Plumer2 3 the Court wisely
15. The primary actors were Thomas Shelton, Chief Justice William H. Taft, and Senator Albert Cummins. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1050-98, 1188; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered
Common Law: The FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
909, 948-61 (1987).
16. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1106-07.
17. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 103940.
18. See S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 9-16 (1926); Burbank, supra note 9, at 1083-89.
19. See, eg., Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,
312 U.S. 1 (1941).
20. See Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. RV. 693 (1974).
21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
22. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1032-33. Those decisions, however, "raised fears for' the
integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, many of which appeared vulnerable to the developing Erie jurisprudence." Id. at 1032 (footnote omitted).
23. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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disaggregated the "Erie problem." 24 We should remember that the "arguably procedural"2 5 language adduced by Professor Carrington 26 comes
from Justice Harlan's solo concurrence and that, unlike Justice Harlan,
the Court recognized two discrete sources of restrictions on court

rulemaking. 27 But the Court did fail to make clear how the Enabling
Act's restrictions are functionally different from those imposed on Con-

gress by the Constitution. Moreover-a possible explanation for that
failure-the Court erroneously attributed both sets of restrictions to con-

28
cerns about federalism.
29
In revisiting the opinion in Hanna, Professor Ely clarified much,

but his revised approach to the Enabling Act,30 although obviously more

restrictive than the Court's, is not obviously an improvement. His approach substitutes restrictions on rule application for restrictions on rule

formulation, confining the Act to the protection of existing policy choices
and, more importantly, to the protection of state law. 3 ' It presents the

additional problem of engaging the federal courts in the difficult and
highly manipulable business of ascertaining the policies animating partic-

ular rules of state law. 32 For instance, we are usually left to our own
devices in identifying the policies animating any given limitations provision. That those devices may be teleological is suggested by a compari-

son of commentary suggesting that the foremost policy underlying
statutes of limitations is protecting defendants from stale claims, with a

24. See Ely, supra note 20; Burbank, supra note 9, at 1033-35, 1164-76.
25. "Whereas the unadulterated outcome and forum-shopping tests may err too far toward
honoring state rules, I submit that the Court's 'arguably procedural, ergo constitutional' test moves
too fast and too far in the other direction." Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
26. Professor Carrington acknowledges the provenance and the mischief it may have caused.
See Carrington, supra note 1, at 297; see also id at 296 n.87 (quoting Chief Justice Warren in
Hanna). Elsewhere, however, he seems to compound the mischief. See id. at 296-97; infra text
accompanying note 36.
27. See Ely, supra note 20, at 720; Burbank, supra note 9, at 1034.
28. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1034-35, 1187-88; Burbank, Rules and Discretion,supra note
13, at 699-700. For the continuing effects of this failure on academic commentary, see, e.g., Freer,
Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TULANE L. Rav. 1087, 1104-05 (1989).
29. See Ely, supra note 20, at 693-718.
30. See id. at 718-40.
31. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1113-14, 1122-23, 1187-88; Burbank, Rules and Discretion,
supra note 13, at 700. Although Professor Carrington alludes to Professor Ely's error in focusing
exclusively on federalism to the exclusion of the underlying separation of powers issues, see Carrington, supra note 1, at 298, it is not clear that he has escaped preoccupation with the protection of
existing policy choices (as opposed to allocation of policy choices). See id. at 290, 316-17.
32. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1127 & n.510, 1190-91.
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recent Fourth Circuit decision denying that such a policy animates stat33
utes of limitations as opposed to statutes of repose.
Contrary to a suggestion in Professor Carrington's article, 34 the
Court's 1987 opinion in Burlington Northern Railroad v. Woods, 35 did
not perpetuate Justice Harlan's caricature of the Court's opinion in
Hanna.3 6 Nor, however, did it provide additional guidance on the Enabling Act's restrictions, as Professor Carrington seems to think, 37 one
reason why another serious student of court rulemaking regards Burlington Northern as a disaster.38 Although Professor Carrington's discussion

of the role of the Rules of Decision Act 39 in the Court's opinions and of
its proper role in resolving these questions is somewhat confusing, 40 he
acknowledges that the Rules Enabling Act is concerned about allocation
33. Compare F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 4.16, at 218-19 (3d ed. 1985)
(ordering "[protection of a defendant from stale claims" and "[p]rotection of defendant from insecurity" ahead of "[p]rotection of courts from the burden of stale claims" in policy analysis) with
Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987) ("principal purpose of limiting statutes is
the prevention of stale claims [from the perspective of courts], and ... the repose of defendants is
merely an incidental benefit"), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2871 (1988); Burbank, supra note 9, at 1188
("[N]either uniformity nor simplicity is well served by a rulemaking charter that sanctions Federal
Rules valid in one state and not in another, here today, gone tomorrow.") (footnote omitted).
34. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 298-99.
35. 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
36. See supra note 25.
37. See Carrington, supra note 1,at 298-99, 307-08 (contending that Burlington Northern added an "interpretive gloss" to the Act, barring Federal Rules having an effect on substantive rights
that is more than "incidental"). The passage from Burlington Northern quoted by Professor Carrington, id, at 299 (quoting Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5), adds nothing to Hanna,see Hanna,
380 US. at 464-65, or Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946), from
which it was drawn. Thus, Burlington Northern reaffirmed the Court's toothless interpretation of
the Enabling Act shortly before the Court admitted that some of its work product has "important,"
not "incidental," effects on substantive rights. See infra text accompanying note 189.
38. See Whitten, Erie and the Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal after Burlington
Northern Railroad v. Woods, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 41-42 (1987).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) provides: "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply."
40. See, eg., Carrington, supra note 1, at 296 ('he Rules of Decision Act was clarified in
Hanna v. Plumer."); id. at 297 ("Hanna surely seems to have gotten the Rules of Decision Act
right."); id. at 299 (Burlington Northern involved "a challenge based on the Rules of Decision
Act."). In fact, neither in dictum nor in holding did the Court in Hanna even cite the Rules of
Decision Act. See Westen & Lehman, Is There Lifefor Erie After the Death ofDiversity?, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 371 n.181 (1980); Burbank, IntedurisdictionalPreclusion, FullFaith and Credit and
Federal Common Law: A GeneralApproach, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 733, 756, 787-88 (1986) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Burbank, IntedurisdictionalPreclusion]. This proves only the influence
of Professor Ely's gloss on that opinion. See Ely, supra note 20, at 707-18. From what appears in
the Court's opinion in Burlington Northern, neither did the parties in that case mention the Rules of
Decision Act. See 480 U.S. at 3. Here, appearances comport with reality: no party so much as cited
the Rules of Decision Act. See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at vii-viii, x-xi, Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods,

480 U.S. 1 (1987).
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of federal powers.4 1 The Court in Burlington Northern evinced no
greater awareness of that fact than it had in Hanna.42
It cannot be easy for one who acknowledges that statutory restrictions were imposed for one purpose (allocation of federal powers) to deploy Supreme Court interpretations of those restrictions deriving from a
wholly different understanding (federalism), 4 3 which may explain Professor Carrington's schizophrenic treatment of Hanna44 and his roseate
view of Burlington Northern.45 In any event, Walter Wheeler Cook
would not have approved.
I believe that, under the original Enabling Act, the restrictions on
court rulemaking should have been read to effect the purpose of allocating federal lawmaking power of the legislative type, not just to protect

existing law, and certainly not just to protect state law. 46 A legal rule
may or may not have ascertainable purposes. But we know that some
legal rules, whatever policies supposedly animate them, have quite dramatic effects. Thus, I also believe that prospective federal lawmaking
that necessarily and obviously involves policy choices with a predictable
More fundamentally, it is confusing or worse to term any challenge to the application of a
pertinent Federal Rule (as to which there was doubt in Burlington Northern) "a challenge based on
the Rules of Decision Act," whatever the ground of federal jurisdiction or the source of the law
claimed to apply in its stead. The part of the Court's opinion in Hanna that Professor Ely glossed
under the Rules of Decision Act was dictum proceeding on the assumption, contrary to the holding,
that there was no pertinent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 466-72. The
Constitution protects against overreaching by the federal government as against the states. The
Enabling Act protects against overreaching by the Supreme Court acting prospectively as against
Congress, and derivatively as against the states. "Valid Federal Rules displace state law under the
Rules of Decision Act not because they are 'Acts of Congress' but because they are provided for by
an act of Congress and one, moreover, that was enacted after the Rules of Decision Act." Burbank,
InterurisdictionalPreclusion, supra at 773; see also Ely, supra note 20, at 718. And again, this is
true whatever the ground of federal jurisdiction or the source of the law claimed to apply. See
Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, supra, at 753-62; infra text accompanying note 96. But see
Carrington, supra note 1, at 295 (suggesting that Rules of Decision Act relevant only "in federal
diversity litigation"); id. at 316.
41. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 298.
42. See Burbank, Rules andDiscretion, supra note 13, at 699-701; see also Omni Capital Int'l v.
Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 111 (1987) (suggesting that the Court could promulgate a valid Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure "authorizing service [of process] on an alien in a federal question case").
But see Burbank, supra note 9, at 1172-73 n.673; Whitten, Separation of Powers Restrictions on
JudicialRulemaking: A Case Study of FederalRule 4, 40 ME. L. Rav. 41 (1988).
43. See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 701.
44. Compare Carrington, supra note 1, at 297-99 (Hanna's "false step") with id. at 316 ("Had
Hanna been decided otherwise, one might be tempted to suggest, as a problematic case ....
)
(footnote omitted); id. at 319 ("Hanna gave an affirmative answer to both questions [set forth infra
note 71] in an action to enforce a state-created right.") (footnote omitted); id. at 320 ("Wonder as we
may, the fact is that Hanna did establish Rule 4 as a source of limitations law."). See also infra text
accompanying note 88.
45. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
46. See, eg., Burbank, supra note 9, at 1106-14, 1122-25, 1187-88.
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and identifiable impact on rights claimed under substantive law is properly the province of Congress. 47 Both the prospective formulation of a
limitations period-two years or four years?-and the prospective formulation of a rule to determine when that period ceases to run in response to litigation activity-filing or service?-involve policy choices of

this type. They are not, contrary to Professor Carrington's view, suitable
subjects for court rules. 48 Neither is it appropriate for a court rule, under
the guise of "relation back," to permit a new party to be haled into court
beyond the period of the applicable limitations period, at least when

49
there is no relationship between the original and new parties.
The 1938 relation back provision in Rule 15(c) is, as Professor Carrington suggests, more difficult to analyze. 50 Mindful of the inattention

to, confusion about, and outright dissembling regarding questions of
power by members of the original Advisory Committee,5 1 I cannot acquiesce in any inference of validity from the mere existence of that provision.52 Moreover, we should recall that Congress was assured in 1938
that the Court would be "zealous to correct [a] mistake, if any has been
47. See id at 1127-31, 1189-93.
48. See id at 1128. Professor Carrington does not advocate a view of the Enabling Act that
would permit the Court to create a limitations period by court rule. But he does argue that the
second type of rule (filing or service?) is valid. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 321.
49. See FED. R. CIv. P. 15(c):
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the
party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied
and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be
brought in by amendment, that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (2)
knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party, the action would have been brought against the party.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or the United States
Attorney's designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer
who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1)
and (2) hereof with respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be
brought into the action as a defendant.
See also Carrington, supra note 1, at 312.
50. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 310-11. It is not true, however, that the original rule
"could have no other referent," id. at 310, than limitations law. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1497, at 492 (1971) ("subject matter jurisdiction, venue or
personal jurisdiction").
51. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1132-37.
52. But see Carrington, supra note 1,at 310. Professor Carrington's citation of my work in
support of the proposition that "even in 1938, it was clear enough to rulemakers that some rules
bearing on limitations law would fall within the authority conferred by the first sentence of the 1934
Act," id. (footnote omitted), is mystifying. The technique I discussed in the article he cites, see id. at
310 n.182-reverse incorporation-involves the use of a Federal Rule by a court making common
law. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1158-63; infra text accompanying note 64. More generally, as
observed in the text and illustrated by one of the quotations that begins this Comment, the
rulemakers had no coherent concept of their authority.
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made."'5 3 Such zeal 5 4 Nor am I content to rest with then-Professor
Kaplan's observation in discussing Rule 25 on substitution of parties,
55
that the Rule deals with "an incident of an already existing action."
Given that fact, however, and given that the Court unquestionably had
the power to banish both fact pleading and the concept of a cause of
action from federal practice,5 6 and given that decisions discovering a new
cause of action in an amended pleading were hardly predictable, 57 I will
not claim overreaching.
Implicit in what I have said above, and explicit in what I have previously written about the Enabling Act, is the view that when the Supreme
Court makes law through supervisory court rules, it is engaged in an
enterprise that, both practically and normatively, is different in important respects from the enterprise in which the Court, or any federal
court, is engaged when it makes federal common law.5 8 Incorporation of
preexisting federal common law in court rules is, on the other hand, both
understandable and easy enough to defend against a technical attack so
long as the common law rule is valid in both federal question and state

law diversity cases. When the common law rule could not validly be
applied in a state law diversity case because of Erie and its progeny, the
incorporation technique is a bootstrap operation.5 9 Rule 23.1 on derivative actions provides a good example of this.6
53. Letter from Edgar B. Tolman to the Hon. J.C. O'Mahoney, the Hon. W.H. King, the Hon.
E.R. Benke, and the Hon. W.R. Austin (May 26, 1938), reprintedin Hearingson SJ Res.281 Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 1, app. 69, 72 (1938).
54. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1179:
With the exception of cases in which it has read Federal Rules not to apply, however, the
main thing the Supreme Court has been zealous about in considering challenges to their
validity has been taking cover behind the process employed prior to their effective date,
particularly that part of it permitting congressional review. Such has been the rulemaking

renvoi.
See also Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 700 & n.53.
55. Kaplan, Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,1961-63(II), 77 HARV. L.
REV. 801, 810 (1964); see Burbank, supra note 9, at 1156 & n.607.
56. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 310.
57. See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 729-34 (2d ed. 1947); R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF
THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 184-85 (1952).
58. See, eg., Burbank, supra note 9, at 1147-57, 1192-93; Burbank, Rules and Discretion,supra
note 13, at 698-713.
59. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1147-55.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to enforce a right
of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the corporation or association having
failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified
and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the
transaction of which the plaintiff complains or that the plaintiff's share or membership
thereafter devolved on the plaintiff by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not
otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made
by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
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Professor Carrington may be thought to suggest that criticism of the
Court for relying on Rule 3 to provide the rule for stopping a borrowed
federal period of limitations in West v. Conrail6 1-a federal question
case-is an academic exercise, 62 although his treatment of that decision
is also schizophrenic. 63 One alternative approach to the problem, and
one means of rationalizing the result in West, would involve what I have
called reverse incorporation: the use of an existing court rule in its incorporated substantive aspects as federal common law. 64 I harbor no serious doubts about the Court's power to fashion a uniform tolling rule for
the applicable limitations period in most federal question cases. 65 The
problem with reverse incorporation here is not only that Rule 3 does not
reflect the accumulated experience of case law, i.e., "preexisting federal
common law," and thus is not an example of incorporation; it is also
that, were the Court to proceed on a case-by-case or statute-by-statute
basis, it would be unlikely to find that filing is the appropriate tolling
authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members, and the reasons for the
plaintiff's failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The derivative action
may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of
the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be
given to shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs.
See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1154-55.
61. 481 U.S. 35 (1987).
62. See Burbank, Rules andDiscretion, supra note 13, at 699; Carrington, supra note 1, at 31415. Yet he now goes on to term "this interpretation of the decision [L e., resort to Rule 3 as a gap.
filler] doubtful." Id. at 315.
63. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Having acknowledged that the Court "recognized the tolling effect of Rule 3 without questioning whether such a tolling rule is authorized by the
Rules Enabling Act," Carrington, supra note 1, at 314, Professor Carrington asserts that "West...
leaves little doubt that separation of powers considerations are... no impediment to the creation by
court rule of a provision for commencement-by-filing." Id. at 316.
64. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1158-63.
65. The notable exception is cases governed by 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which states:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this Title, and of Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall
be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such
laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and
punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal
cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of
the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party
found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982,
1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).

Vol. 1989:1012]

COMMENT ON CARRINGTON

1023

event for every federal and borrowed federal or state statute it encountered.6 6 At the least, the experience might cause the Court to doubt
whether the benefits of a trans-substantive tolling rule were worth the
costs, including the costs to litigants of multiple sources of limitations

law, 67 particularly when the Court realized that Rule 3 cannot in any
event provide the solution for federal question cases brought in state
court.

68

Even if the Court were to announce a trans-substantive federal tolling rule for federal question cases in state court that is identical to Rule

3, it probably would not be able to avoid problems created by another
mistake it has made, first in Hanna and again in West. That mistake is
the subject of comment by Professor Carrington and prompts his inquiries regarding Rule 4. I refer to the highly artificial parsing of the Massachusetts statute in Hanna into limitations provisions and "notice"
provisions, 69 and a similar sleight of hand in West. 70 First, to address
two of Professor Carrington's questions: 71 the Court in Hanna did not
assert, and I believe that it would have denied, that it was using Rule 4 to
72
toll (i.e., stop the running of) a statute of limitations in a diversity case.
To reframe and answer another of his questions, 73 the reason for this
technique in Hanna seems clear. By invoking a "threat to the goal of
uniformity of federal procedure" 74 that did not exist-none of the state
66. This analysis is developed in greater detail in Burbank, Rules andDiscretion,supra note 13,
at 707-09.
67. Compare Carrington, supra note 1, at 315 (trans-substantive rule is "less complex") with
Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 709 ("The resulting melange of legal sources
might seem more complicated, a perception that could impose costs of its own."). See also id. at
707-09 (trans-substantive rules distort substantive law).
68. See FED.R. Civ. P. 1; Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 710-12.
69. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 462-63 n.1 (1965); Burbank, supra note 9, at 1173-76;
Burbank, Rules and Discretion,supra note 13, at 707.
70. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 38-39, 40 n.7 (1987); Burbank, Rules and Discretion,
supra note 13, at 707-08.
71. "Should this rule (Rule 4) be given effect as a prescription of the conduct required of the
plaintiff-namely the means by which notice is given to the defendant-to make a timely commencement of an action? If so, is it a valid exercise of the rulemaking power?" Carrington, supra note 1,
at 319; see supra note 44.
72. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1173-76. But see Carrington, supra note 1, at 319 ("Hanna
gave an affirmative answer to both questions in an action to enforce a state-created right"); id. at 320
("Hanna did establish Rule 4 as a source of limitations law.").
73. "One may still wonder why the Court did not read Rule 4 more narrowly so that it applies
only to resolve questions of the sufficiency of notice to the defendant and the power of the court over
her person ....
" Carrington, supra note 1, at 319. This, of course, is not a wonder if one takes the
view that the Court in Hanna would have denied the broad reading of Rule 4 imputed to it by
Professor Carrington. See supra text accompanying note 72. The question rather is why the Court
wrenched the Massachusetts statute out of shape.
74. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 463 (1965).
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statutes cited in support of the threat involved service or "notice" in con-

nection with a state limitations provision-"and by dissecting the Massachusetts statute with a scalpel, the Court in Hanna provided itself with
an occasion to circumvent the Act's limitations in the interest of clarifying the confusion wrought by its"' 75 prior decisions.
The quest for uniformity, however simple-minded, also serves as an

adequate explanation of the Court's invocation of Rule 40) in West 76 as
a backstop to Rule 3, a feat that turned a six-month period into a tenmonth period. 77 In West, however, the manipulation was even more
egregious than in Hanna because Rule 4(j) is a statute, 78 and its legislative history makes crystal clear that, contrary to Professor Carrington's

75. Burbank, supra note 9, at 1176.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 4G) provides:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days
after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required
cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall
be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with
notice to such party or upon motion. This subdivision shall not apply to service in a foreign country pursuant to subdivision (i) of this rule.
77. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 37, 40 n.7 (1987); Burbank, Rules and Discretion,supra
note 13, at 707-09.
78. Rule 4(i) was added by Pub. L. No. 97-462, § 2, 96 Stat. 2527, 2528 (1983).
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confident assertions, 79 it was not intended to function as limitations
80
law.
79. Carrington, supra note 1, at 320-21 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added):
Wonder as we may, the fact is that Hanna did establish Rule 4 as a source of limitations
law. The Court seemed to say with respect to limitations matters, that the Rules Enabling
Act trumps the Rules of Decision Act wherever both are played on the same trick even
with respect to provisions having no necessary application. As others have remarked, this
position is inconsistent with the approach, although not the holdings, in Ragan and
Walker. But such remarks only emphasize the reality that Rule 4 is now a provision of
federal limitations law as well as a prescription of the method by which defendants are
notified of actions filed against them. Perhapsfor additional emphasis, Congress in 1982
also added subdivision (j) to Rule 4, a provision with potentially substantialconsequences as
limitationslaw.
If there could be any doubt about Rule 4's validity as limitations law, the doubt was
erased in 1982 by the adoption ofRule 4 as a statute. Under this circumstance, no separation of powers issue can remain.
Despite this certainty, it may be useful to inquire ....
See also id. at 320 n.247 (Rule 4(j) "can be even more readily construed as an implied tolling provision than can those provisions of Rule 4 which originated with court rulemaking.").
This passage is remarkable for a number of reasons other than its assertions about Rule 4G).
See infra note 80. As noted above, Hanna did not "establish Rule 4 as a source of limitations law."
See supra text accompanying note 72. Even if reasonable people can disagree about what the Court
thought it was doing in Hanna, once it is recognized that the Court in that case proceeded from an
erroneous premise about the purpose of the procedure/substance dichotomy, it is hard to agree that
the decision "establish[es]" anything about the Enabling Act. See supra text accompanying notes 2345. Finally, the suggestion that Congress may have added Rule 4j) "for additional emphasis" and
the notion that "any doubt about Rule 4's validity as limitations law ...was erased in 1982 [sic] by
the adoption of Rule 4 as a statute," are both irrelevant and wrong. Apart from the evidence in the
legislative history that Rule 4(j) was not intended to serve as a "tolling rule," see infra note 80 and
accompanying text, the legislation of which Rule 4G) was a part did not include amendments to the
provision at issue in Hanna, Rule 4(d)(1). See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461-66, 474; Pub. L. No. 97-462,
96 Stat. 2527, 2528 (1983). In other words, not all of Rule 4 was adopted as a statute in 1983. And
even if it had been, what does that prove about the Enabling Act?
80. In the absence of any committee reports, the explanation of the bill that was enacted given
by its sponsor, Representative Edwards, is the best evidence on this point. With reference to Rule
4) he explained:
Like proposed subsection (j), H.R. 7154 provides that a dismissal for failure to serve within
120 days shall be "without prejudice". Proposed subsection @i)was criticized by some for
ambiguity because, it was argued, neither the text of subsection (j) nor the Advisory Committee Note indicated whether a dismissal without prejudice would toll a statute of limitation. See House Report 97-662, at 3-4 (1982). The problem would arise when a plaintiff
files the complaint within the applicable statute of limitation period but does not effect
service within 120 days. If the statute of limitation period expires during that period, and
if the plaintiff's action is dismissed "without prejudice," can the plaintiff refile the complaint and maintain the action? The answer depends upon how the statute of limitation is
tolled.
If the law provides that the statute of limitation is tolled by filing and service of the
complaint, then a dismissal under H.R. 7154 for failure to serve within the 120 days would,
by the terms of the law controllingthe tolling, bar the plaintiff from later maintaining the
cause of action. If the law provides that the statute of limitation is tolled by fling alone,
then the status of the plaintiffs's cause of action turns upon the plaintiff's diligence. If the
plaintiff has not been diligent, the court will dismiss the complaint for failure to serve
within 120 days, and the plaintiff will be barred from later maintaining the cause of action
because the statute of limitation has run. A dismissal without prejudice does not confer
upon the plaintiff any rights that the plaintiff does not otherwise possess and leaves a plaintiff whose action has been dismissed in the same position as if the action had never been
filed. If, on the other hand, the plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to effect service, then
the plaintiff can move under Rule 6(b) to enlarge the time within which to serve or can
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What then are the problems I refer to that would attend a transsubstantive federal tolling rule for federal question cases in state court?
As a result of West, real uniformity as to limitations in federal question
cases can come about only if the Court is willing to impose on state
courts common law rules that are identical, not just to Rule 3, but also to
Rule 40).81 As one who, in the context of preclusion law, has advocated
clearer thinking about federal common law in state courts, 2 I await the
denouement with some trepidation. Federal limitations law is a mess,
3
one that deserves sustained congressional attention.8
Whatever the difficulties with reverse incorporation, imputing that
process (or simply sloppy shorthand for federal common law) to the
Court in West would at least permit the decision to co-exist with the
Court's earlier decision in Walker v. Armco Steel Co., a diversity state
law case. 84 In contrast, taking West at face value as a direct application
of Rule 3 rather than an expression of federal common law incorporating
Rule 3, the two cases can be reconciled only if Rule 3 is accorded two
"plain meaning[s]," 8 5 -one for diversity state law cases and another for
oppose dismissal for failure to serve. A court would undoubtedly permit such a plaintiff
additional time within which to effect service. Thus, a diligent plaintiff can preserve the
cause of action. This result is consistent with the policy behind the time limit for service
and with statutes of limitation, both of which are designed to encourage prompt movement
of civil actions in the federal courts.
128 CONG. REc. 30,931-32 (1982) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The footnote omitted at the end of the first quoted paragraph imparts special irony to the use
Professor Carrington makes of Rule 4(j), as well as to the assertions he makes about Rule 4. See
supra note 79.
The law governing the tolling of a statute of limitation depends upon the type of civil
action involved. In a diversity action, state law governs tolling. Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750-51 (1980). In Walker, plaintiff had filed his complaint and
thereby commenced the action under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure within
the statutory period. He did not, however, serve the summons and complaint until after
the statutory period had run. The Court held that state law (which required both filing and
service within the statutory period) governed, barring plaintiff's action.
In the federal question action, the courts of appeals have generally held that Rule 3
governs, so that the filing of the complaint tolls a statute of limitation.... The continued
validity of this line of cases, however, must be questioned in light of the Walker case, even
though the Courtin that case expressly reservedjudgment aboutfederal question actions,see
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 741, [sic] 751 n.l1 (1980).
128 CONG. REC. 30,931-32 n.12 (1982) (emphasis added).
81. See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 712.
82. See Burbank, InterurisdictionalPreclusion, supra note 40, at 805-10; Burbank, Rules and
Discretion, supra note 13, at 710-12.
83. See Burbank, Rules and Discretion,supra note 13, at 712-13; Lewellen v. Morley, 875 F.2d
118, 121 (7th Cir. 1989); White, Some Current Debates, 73 JUDICATURE 155, 158 (1989).
There is reason to hope that the Federal Courts Study Committee established by Title I of Pub.
L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988), will make recommendations to clean up the mess.
84. 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
85. Having observed that the "Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning," 446 U.S. at
750 n.9, the Court in Walker found "no indication that the Rule was intended to toll a state statute
of limitations." Id. at 750 (footnote omitted). See Burbank, Rules andDiscretion, supra note 13, at
701-02; Carrington, supra note 1, at 315.
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federal question cases. That approach, however, would violate Professor
Carrington's principle of generalism.8 6 Whether for that reason,8 7 or to
have the benefit of the supposed legal results in Hanna and West, however incoherent,88 Professor Carrington asserts that Walker is "simply an
anomaly." 8 9 Both this assertion and his subsequent analysis of the limitations implications of Rule 2390 demonstrate that Professor Carrington
has paid insufficient attention to the differences between federal court
rulemaking and federal common law. As in his reading of Rule 4, he has
"see[n] in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure support for [limitations]
rules that is not there." 91
Rule 23 does not provide a rule for tolling the applicable limitations
period, state or federal, in a class action brought in federal court, 92 and
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 93 does not suggest otherwise.
In that case, the Supreme Court was making federal common law. Both
the governing substantive law and the applicable limitations period were
federal. 94 As there could be no doubt under either the Court's approach
to federal common law 95 or an approach that takes the Rules of Decision
Act seriously, 96 that the tolling rule should be uniform, 97 in creating it
the Court had "the power to fashion a [rule] that [was] fully adequate in
light of all of the policies and interests that a common law court would
consider in making law to govern the matter. 9 8 Even though Rule 23
does not and could not validly provide a tolling rule, in devising such a
rule "not inconsistent with the legislative purpose," 99 the Court was not
required to ignore the policies exogenous to limitations that animate

86. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 302-05. For criticisms of Professor Carrington's views on
this subject, see Burbank, Transformation, supra note 13, at 1935-37, 1939-41. See also infra text
accompanying notes 196, 211-13.
87. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 315; see also infra text accompanying note 153.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 34-45; supra note 79.
89. Carrington, supra note 1, at 316.
90. Id. at 317-18.
91. Burbank, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, supra note 40, at 771 (footnote omitted).
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

414 U.S. 538 (1974).
See id. at 541-42.
See Burbank, InterurisdictionalPreclusion,supra note 40, at 755-58.
See id. at 758-62.
See id. at 773-76.
Id. at 771 (footnote omitted).
American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974); see also id. at 557-58 &
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Rule 23,100 including in particular the policy against "multiplicity of activity. ' 10 1 The Court was not persuaded by the attempt of the petitioners
in American Pipe to measure the Court's power to make law "by judicial
decision" according to its power to make law by "court rule."10 2 Nor

should we be persuaded by Professor Carrington's description of American Pipe as involving "the use of Rule 23 to toll the statute during the
10 3
pendency of the class suit."
Similarly, in Chardon v. Fumero Soto 1 04 the Court did not, as Professor Carrington would have it, apply Puerto Rican limitations law "on

the authority of Rule 23."105 The Court was directed to apply state law
by 42 U.S.C. § 1988,106 which I have previously described as "a statute

similar to the Rules of Decision Act but more narrowly focused and
hence not as easy to ignore or wish away,' 10 7 a description that now
appears to be optimistic. Had the Puerto Rican tolling provision been

less generous, creating a risk of a multiplicity of actions to avoid a time
bar, the Court might have been required to determine whether it should
yield because it was "inconsistent with the . . . laws of the United
States," 10 8 of which Rule 23, for these purposes, is one. 10 9 No more than
100. Burbank, IntejurisdictionalPreclusion, supra note 40, at 773-74 (footnotes omitted):
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not, however, irrelevant. The Rules Enabling Act
authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate "general"-that is, uniform-Federal Rules
of practice and procedure.... Valid Federal Rules displace state law under the Rules of
Decision Act not because they are "Acts of Congress" but because they are provided for by
an act of Congress and one, moreover, that was enacted after the Rules of Decision Act. In
authorizing the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress must have contemplated that
the federal courts would interpret them, fill their interstices, and, when necessary, ensure
that their provisions were not frustrated by other legal rules. That does not mean that the
federal courts are free to create uniform federal decisional law or displace particular state
law rules in areas untouched by the Federal Rules. It does mean, however, that when the
Supreme Court has exercised the power delegated by Congress to prescribe uniform Federal Rules, we should regard those Rules, if valid, as if they were acts of Congress. In
effect, they are assimilated to the Enabling Act for purposes of the Rules of Decision Act.
Because Federal Rules cannot validly provide for the creation of federal common lawRule 83 in that aspect is invalid-they are sources of power only if, fairly read, they may be
said to require it.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can thus serve as sources of federal common law, not
only by leaving interstices to be filled but also by expressing policies that are pertinent in
areas not covered by the Rules. Even when legal regulation in a certain area is forbidden to
the Rules, the policies underlying valid Rules may help to shape valid federal common law.
101. American Pipe, 414 U.S. at 551.
102. Id. at 556 (footnote omitted). In the footnote to this description of the petitioners' argument, the Court quoted from the Enabling Act. Id. at 556 n.26.
103. Carrington, supra note 1, at 318. See infra note 129.
104. 462 U.S. 650 (1983).
105. Carrington, supra note 1, at 318; see also id. ("Rule 23... used as a source of limitations
law ... to invoke the tolling provision of Puerto Rican law").
106. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). For the text of § 1988, see supra note 65.
107. Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 705.
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
109. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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Rule 4 does Rule 23 itself advance Professor Carrington's thesis regarding the original Enabling Act; unlike Hanna v. Plumer, the Court's decisions interpreting Rule 23 do not advance that thesis at all. 110
The "original Enabling Act" no longer exists, however, having been
replaced by title IV of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act."' 1 Professor Carrington celebrates one decision made by Congress
in overhauling the statutory provisions that govern supervisory and local
court rulemaking-the decision to retain the supersession clause. 112 In-

deed, he supports his defense of that provision by reference to the legislative history. 113 He does not, however, discuss other parts of the 1988

legislation or its legislative history that may have implications for the
questions he addresses, rendering irrelevant both the "functional analysis
[and] ...half century of experience with rules touching on limitations
issues" 11 4 on which he relies. Perhaps that is because the words of the
basic grant of rulemaking authority are similar, 115 and Professor

110. Put another way, Professor Carrington and I agree that "[i]t would have been harsh gamesmanship in either case to bar the individual claimants who may have relied on the filing of the class
suit to protect their interests and nothing in the Rules Enabling Act could have required such resuits." Carrington, supra note 1, at 318-19. In both cases, however, the Enabling Act was irrelevant: in American Pipe because the Court was fashioning federal common law, and in Chardon
because it was following the mandate of section 1988.
Ill. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-52 (1988).
112. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 321-26.
113. See id. at 324 n.260.
114. Id. at 321.
115. Prior to its amendment in 1988, section 2072 provided:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribeby general rules, the forms ofprocess,
writs, pleadings,and motions, and the practiceandprocedureof the district courts andcourts
ofappeals of the United States in civil actions, including admiralty and maritime cases, and
appeals therein, and the practice and procedure in proceedings for the review by the couris
of appeals of decisions of the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial review or
enforcement of orders of administrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rulesshall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantiveright and shall preserve
the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to
the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by the Chief
Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not later than the first day
of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary notwithstanding,
shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules heretofore prescribed by the
Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982) (emphasis added).
For the text following amendment, see supra note 5.
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Carrington neglected the possibility that their interpretation might be informed by the legislative history.' 16 Ignorance or neglect of the legisla117
tive history of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 was pandemic.
Alternatively, Professor Carrington may not agree that the legislative history of the 1988 Act in question is relevant or helpful. Let us first
see what light, if any, that history sheds on the interpretation of its limitations on court rulemaking. We can then consider questions of relevance and weight and thus determine whether the guest list for Professor
Carrington's party should be expanded.
The 1988 legislation revising the arrangements for federal court
rulemaking was born in the House of Representatives. As described in
the 1988 House Judiciary Committee Report:
These provisions have evolved from a review of the operation of the
current Rules Enabling Acts that dates back to activities of the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice in the 98th and 99th Congresses. Title I of the bill before the
House is substantially identical to H.R. 1507, a bill that, with minor
changes, is identical to a bill (H.R. 3550) passed unanimously by the
House in the 99th Congress. The Committee's Report on last Congresses' bill applies to the provisions of title , except as noted below.
Title I is also virtually identical with title II of H.R. 2182118
that passed
the House during the first session of the 100th Congress.
With the exception of the language regarding supersession, the
changes to section 2072 proposed in the Senate bill, which was enacted,
11 9 their source. 120
were identical to those proposed in the House bill,

116. Yet, Professor Carrington has elsewhere referred to the very legislative document that is
discussed herein. See Carrington, Bogy, supra note 3, at 2073 n.34, 2086 n.108.

117. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1023-24. Particularly since Professor Carrington is not in
this group, see, eg., Carrington, supra note 1, at 288, 308-09, his assertion that the 1934 Act's
"legislative history is limited," id. at 282-83, is surprising. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 432-33
("[tihere is an uncommonly rich legislative history" accompanying the Enabling Act).
118. H.R. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added);

see id. at 27-29.
119. Compare S. 1482, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401(a), 134 CONG. REc. S16,286 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1988) (proposed Senate amendments to § 2072) with H.R. 4807, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 101(a),
134 CONG. Rnc. H7444 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (proposed House amendments to § 2072). See also
134 CONG. REc. H10,432 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988).
120. See infra text accompanying note 132.
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With the same exception, the changes were also identical to those proposed in H.R. 3550,121 which was explained in a House Judiciary Committee Report 122 that was specifically incorporated by reference in the
12 3
Report on the 1988 House bill.
The House Judiciary Committee Report on H.R. 3550 stated that
the bill "improves the rulemaking process because it .

.

. clarifies the

limitations on national or supervisory rulemaking by the Supreme
Court."' 124 The Report contains a lengthy account of "[c]riticism of the

rulemaking process,"' 2 5 including specific criticisms of the 1983 and
1984 proposals to amend Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 as ultra
vires. 126 More important, the Report's section-by-section analysis elaborates the bill's limitations on the rulemaking power:
Proposed section 2072 contains limitations on the rulemaking
power, careful observance of which is essential in the future if
problems of the sort that prompted this legislation are not to recur.
The most important of these limitations is that rules promulgated
by the Supreme Court for lower federal courts (supervisory court
rules) be "rules of practice and procedure" that do not "abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." The language is derived from
current law. As interpreted by the Court, however, the language has
little if any determinative content. As a result, the rules enabling acts
have failed to provide guidance to the rulemakers or to Congress in
considering the validity of proposed rules.
It appears that, as used in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the
restriction regarding substantive rights was intended to emphasize
some of the limitations on the delegation of prospective lawmaking
power thought to inhere in the notion of court rules of "practice and
procedure." Because there is no shared conception of such limitations
today, the Committee believes that it must take some care in stating its
views on the scope of Congress' delegation under proposed section
2072.
First, it is not the purpose of proposed section 2072 merely to
restate whatever may be the constitutional restraints on the exercise of
Congress' lawmaking power as against that of the States or on the delegation of Congress' lawmaking power to the Supreme Court. Rather,
proposed section 2072 contains independent limitations on supervisory
court rulemaking, which Congress has the power to impose and which
have the effect of delegating only a portion of Congress' power.
121. Compare S. 1482, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., § 401(a), 134 CONG. Rlc. S16,286 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1988) with H.R. 3550, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1985), reprintedin H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1985).
122. H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
123. See supra text accompanying note 118; H.R. RP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1988)
(referring to H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) in section-by-section analysis).
124. H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985).
125. Id. at 12-14.
126. See id. at 13.
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Second, Congress' lawmaking power regarding matters of practice
and procedure extends to all litigation in the federal courts. The limitations on rulemaking imposed by proposed section 2072 therefore
protect Congress' prerogatives as to all such cases, not just those in
which state law furnishes the rule of decision. Thus, for instance, the
legislation is fully operative as to bankruptcy rules, which are formulated for cases that are within exclusive federal jurisdiction and that
are governed largely by federal substantive law.
Third, the limitations on rulemaking in proposed section 2072
protect some lawmaking that has already occurred. In addition and
more generally, the limitations reserve for Congress, within its constitutionally permitted domain, decisions as to whether there should be
prospective federal regulation of certain matters and what the content
of that regulation should be. Where Congress chooses not to legislate
on matters reserved to it by the operation of the limitations on supervisory court rulemaking in proposed section 2072, the determination
whether in a particular case state law applies or there is pertinent and
valid federal law (i.e., federal common
law) depends upon other
127
sources of federal lawmaking authority.

Turning to the implementation of the bill's restrictions on supervisory
court rulemaking, the Report continues:
Fourth, the substantive rights protected by proposed section 2072
include rights conferred, or that might be conferred, by rules of substantive law, such as "the right not to be injured . . . by another's
negligence" or the right not to be subject to discrimination in employment on the basis of race. Thus, the bill does not confer power on the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules regardingmatters, such as limitations andpreclusion, that necessarilyand obviously define or limit rights
under the substantive law. The protection extends beyond rules of substantive law, narrowly defined, however. At the least, it also prevents
the application of rules, otherwise valid, where such rules would have
the effect of altering existing remedial rights conferred as an integral
part of the applicable substantive law scheme, federal or state, such as
arrangements for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. More generally, proposed section 2072 is intended to allocate to Congress, as opposed to the Supreme Court exercising delegated legislative power,
127. Id. at 20-21 (footnotes omitted), with printing errors corrected in 132 CONG. REC. E-177
(daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). The 1988 House Report also incorporated
the corrections by reference. See H.R. REp. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1988).
Lest I be accused of being either "muffled" or "obscure," see supra text accompanying note 4,
let me remind the reader of my participation in congressional deliberations, public and private, that
led to the 1988 legislation amending the Enabling Acts. See supra note *. My views on the proper
interpretation of the 1934 Enabling Act and on the changes needed in that legislation emerged from
scholarly work completed before I was asked to assist the Congress. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note
9; Burbank, Sanctions in the ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Some

Questions About Power, 11 HoFSTRA L. REV. 997 (1983). Indeed, my work is cited twice in the
omitted footnotes to the passage quoted in the text. See H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21
n.7, 22 n.14 (1985).
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lawmaking choices that necessarily and obviously require consideration of policies extrinsic to the business of the courts, such as the recognition or non-recognition of a testimonial privilege. In the absence
of congressional choices, prospective regulation is left to the States.
So viewed, proposed section 2072 leaves to the Supreme Court
primary responsibility for prospective federal regulation of matters peculiarly within the competence of judges. It reserves to Congress deci-

sions concerning prospective federal regulation of matters peculiarly
within its competence, having regard to Congress' representative na-

ture and to its experience in prospective lawmaking that variously affects its constituencies in their out-of-court affairs. Further refinement
of the scope of delegation will undoubtedly prove necessary. The
Committee believes, however, that such refinement should come in the

first instance from those responsible for proposing rules. Conscientious attention to the purposes of, and limitations on, the delegation
should prevent controversy of the sort that has plagued federal supervisory court rulemaking in recent years. Such attention by the

rulemakers should permit Congress to turn its attention from proposed
rules to recommendations for federal legislation on matters that are

beyond the rulemaking power under proposed section 2072
but that
128
nonetheless implicate the interests of the federal courts.

If this House Report explaining the language enacted by Congress is
relevant to the interpretation of amended section 2072, it would seem to
provide substantial guidance on the questions addressed by Professor
Carrington, and in particular to demonstrate that whatever may have
been true prior to December 1, 1988, the Supreme Court now lacks the
power "to promulgate rules regarding matters, such as limitations and
preclusion, that necessarily and obviously define or limit rights under the
substantive law." 12 9 Disregard of the House Judiciary Committee's attempt to "take some care in stating its views on the scope of Congress'
delegation under proposed section 2072"130 requires either specific evidence that that attempt should not be given weight or a general theory to
the same effect.
128. H.R. REP.No. 422, 99th Cong., IstSess. 21-22 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
129. Id. at 21. The Report also observes:
Where Congress chooses not to legislate on matters reserved to it by the operation of the
limitations on supervisory court rulemaking in proposed section 2072, the determination
whether in a particular case state law applies or there is pertinent and valid federal law
(Le., federal common law) depends upon other sources of federal lawmaking authority.
Id. (footnote omitted), with printing error corrected in 132 CONG. REc. E-177 (daily ed. Feb. 3,
1986) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). The footnote, appearing at the end of the quoted sentence,
includes a citation to American Pipe, as follows: "American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414
U.S. 538 (1974) (federal tolling rule applies to federal statutes of limitations in class action subject to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23)." Ia at 21 n.10. See supra text accompanying notes 92-103.
For the effective date of the Enabling Act amendments, see Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 407, 102
Stat. 4642 (1988).
130. H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1985).
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As to specific evidence, the relevant statutory language remained the
same from H.R. 3550 to the legislation that was enacted; the House was
responsible for that language, and the 1988 House Report incorporated
by reference the 1985 House Report, where the language received close
attention.13 1 There was no committee report on the 1988 Senate bill, and
in his explanatory remarks, Senator Heflin acknowledged that "the Kas-

tenmeier subcommittee ha[d] been the leader in developing.., a number
of significant matters in the bill, such as the titles dealing with arbitration
and the rules enabling act amendments."1 32 Moreover, he stated that
"[tihe purpose of the amendments to the rules enabling acts is to modernize the statutory framework, respond to criticism surrounding the
process and promote openness and participation in the rulemaking
133
process."

On the other hand, the section-by-section analysis of the Senate bill
stated that subsection 2072(a) "consolidates but carries forward current
law" 134 and that amended subsection 2072(b) "also carries forward the

scope of current law." 135 Both references might, but need not, be
thought to include judicial interpretations as well as statutory language.
In any event, unlike both the 1985 and 1988 House Judiciary Committee
reports, which were available to the members of the House (and Senate)

prior to the sessions at which action was taken, 136 this analysis was first
131. See supra text accompanying notes 118-23. "Surely an interpretation placed by the sponsor
of a bill on the very language subsequently enacted by Congress cannot be dismissed out of hand...
simply because the interpretation was given two years earlier." United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S.
396, 405 n.14 (1973); see also T.W.A., Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 336 U.S. 601, 605-06 n.6 (1949)
(adhering to congressional intent apparent from bills preceding those resulting in the Air Mail Act of
1934); Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 204 (1980) (where essence of legislation was unchanged between earlier and later drafts "[t]he principal sources for edification concerning the meaning and scope of[35 U.S.C.] § 271" were hearings on legislative proposals leading to its
final enactment); Burbank, supra note 9, at 1098-1101 (discussing relevance of legislative history of
bills essentially identical to Rules Enabling Act of 1934).
132. 134 CONG. REc. S16,294 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
133. Id. at S16,295. The reference to both a purpose to "respond to criticism surrounding the
process" and a purpose to "promote openness and participation in the rulemaking process" is significant. The 1985 House Report discussed criticisms of rulemaking relating to notice, access, and
participation, as well as those relating to issues of power, under the heading, "Criticism of the
rulemakingprocess." H.R. RE'. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-14 (1985); supra text accompanying note 125. Moreover, that report identified as separate benefits of H.R. 3550 "promot[ing] openness in the rulemaking process" and "clariffying] the limitations on national or supervisory
rulemaking by the Supreme Court." H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1985).
134. 134 CONG. REc. S16,300 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988).
135. Id.
136. See 134 CONG. REc. H7452 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("For
further analysis of each title, I recommend a reading of the House report that has been available to
all Members"). See id. at H7452-53 ("Title I has also passed the House on two previous occasions").
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available to the members of the Senate during the late evening session
137
when the Senate bill was discussed and approved.
We have, then, a situation in which the body responsible for developing amendments to legislation sought through detailed legislative history to guard against the assumption that similar statutory language
should be given the same meaning by the courts, while the expectations
13 8
of the other body in that regard remain unclear.
As to a general theory, Professor Carrington notes the "difficulties
that inhere in any use of legislative history,"' 139 as well as difficulties peculiar to the interpretation of the 1934 Enabling Act in the light of "long
usage." 14 0 I have previously addressed the latter subject at length, 14 ' but,

because we are in a new ballgame, both my analysis and Professor Carrington's comments may be irrelevant. Depending on one's view of the
specific evidence discussed above, agreement with Professor Carrington
may require rejection of legislative history as an aid to statutory interpretation, at least in most cases. There are, of course, those who hold that
view, including some in high places. 142 Although the campaign thus to
empower federal judges at the expense of Congress will doubtless
continue, however inconsistently waged, 143 the Court as a whole has recently "explicitly reject[ed]" a broad argument against the use of legislative history, reaffirming its "traditional approach" to legislative history
as "the sounder and more democratic course, the course that strives for
allegiance to Congress' desires in all cases, not just those where Congress'
137. Telephone interview with Monique Abacherli, Chief Clerk of the Subcommittee on Courts
and Administrative Practice of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Sept. 14, 1989). See also 134 CONG.
REc. S16,294 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Heflin) ("Because of the limited time remaining in this Congress, there will not be a committee report accompanying S.1482. I will describe
the provisions of the bill and then will submit for the record a more lengthy explanation providing
background and section-by-section analysis.").
138. H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 216 (1967) (footnote omitted):
Hence, if an intent clearly expressed in committee reports is within the permissible limits of
the language and no construction manifestly more reasonable suggests itself, a court does
pretty well to read the statute to mean what the few legislators having the greatest concern
with it said it meant to them.
Cf Burbank, supra note 9, at 1101-04 (post-1934 developments, including reenactment, do not signify congressional approval of the Court's interpretations).
139. Carrington, supra note 1, at 308 (footnote omitted).
140. Id. at 309.
141. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1098-1106, 1185.
142. See ag, Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2574-80 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 109 S.Ct. 1981, 199495 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). See generally Katzman, Summary of Proceedings,in
JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS 170-75 (R. Katzman ed. 1988); Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DuKE L.J. 371 (1987); White, supra note 83, at 157-58.
143. Compare Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S.Ct. 939, 946-47 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (criticizing Court's use of legislative history) with Sullivan v. Hudson, 109 S.Ct. 2248, 2258-61 (White, Scalia and Kennedy, J.J., dissenting) (using legislative history).
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statutory directive is plainly sensible or borders on the lunatic." 144 Such
allegiance seems particularly fitting here, because the "statutory limitations in question were intended to confine the power of the Court
itself." 145
Finally, I turn to Professor Carrington's defense of the Enabling

Act's supersession provision. I earlier called his proposed interpretation
of that clause "ingenious." 14 6 It evidently derives from Professor
Carrington's desire to preserve the myth of a uniform, trans-substantive
and politically neutral procedural system and, as to the last feature, to
impart some reality to the myth. The reversal that his proposed interpre-

tation would effect in the respective roles of federalism and allocation of
powers under the Enabling Act is as surprising as it is refreshing.1 47
Coming from Professor Carrington, the proposed interpretation is also
surprising because it purchases political neutrality at the cost of transsubstantivity.' 4 8 In any event, Professor Carrington's defense is ahistori-

cal and his proposed interpretation is, I fear, wishful thinking. Moreover, however the clause is interpreted, Professor Carrington's functional

defense of supersession does not withstand close scrutiny.
As a matter of history, there is no support for the distinction that

Professor Carrington draws among the statutory provisions to be superseded, which would translate "[a]ll laws" 149 into "all laws that are not
'arguably substantive.' "150 And what basis is there for his prediction' 51
144. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justie, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 2566 n.9 (1989).
145. Burbank, supra note 9, at 1101; see Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The
Thread, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1682, 1687 (1974).
146. See supra text accompanying note 11.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 166, 192-94.
148. See infra text accompanying note 153.
149. See supra note 5; see also supra note 115.
150. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 325. I leave to the reader whether Professor Carrington's
interpretation "comports with the text of the Act." Id.; see also Id. at 326.
151. Id. at 325-26 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added):
To test this formulation, suppose the Supreme Court promulgated new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure bearing generally on the commencement and tolling problems raised by
limitations laws, such as late discovery of claims, fraudulent concealment, and mental incompetence of the plaintiff. Would such rules, promulgated by the Court and not opposed
by Congress, supersede conflicting provisions set forth in the United States Code? Or, to
take a more specific illustration, could the provision of the NLRA requiring service of a
summons within a six-month period be superseded by a general rule of court that explicitly
imposed the commencement-by-filing rule on all federal cases?
I venture negative answers. The NLRA and those who have a stake in it are safe in their
interests. On no account would the Court hold that the limitations provisions of the
NLRA could be superseded by any general amendments to Rules 3 or 4. Nor would Rule 3
or 4 be read to "abridge or modify" the Labor RelationsAct. This is all sufficiently clear
now that the Supreme Court simply assumed it in dealing with the related case of West v.
Conrail.
Professor Carrington may here be conflating the issue of supersession and the issue of
validity. See infra text accompanying note 163.
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about the Court's response to conflict between a federal statute containing a provision requiring service to stop the running of the limitations
period and Rule 4 or, more likely, 152 Rule 3, an interpretation of the
latter Rule that results in three "plain meanings" and hence in departures from the norm of trans-substantivity beyond that effected by the
Court's decisions interpreting the Rule? 153 Take another hypothetical,
one that vividly demonstrates the potential bite of the supersession provision. Are we to believe that, if the Court had promulgated either the
1983 or 1984 proposal to amend Rule 68,154 and the proposed Rule had
not been blocked by Congress, the Court subsequently would have held
that the Rule did not apply in a case governed by an attorney's fee statute? On what basis? Marek v. Chesny, in which the Court read Rule 68
to require denial of post-offer attorney's fees to a plaintiff who would
otherwise have received those fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, a subsequently enacted statute, hardly suggests sensitivity either to dissonance
between Federal Rules and statutes or to the "arguably substantive"
dimensions of legislation?155 There is no more reason to believe that the
Supreme Court will abnegate power in interpreting the supersession
clause, than that it will overrule Hanna.
We should consider-although Professor Carrington does not-the
possibility that his interpretation, originally offered before the 1988 legislation,15 6 finds support in that legislation or its history. The text of the
supersession clause has remained the same.15 7 The House Judiciary
Committee certainly did not share Professor Carrington's narrow view of
the "laws" subject to supersession; quite the contrary.1 58 But the House
yielded on the retention of the clause.15 9 Again, there was no committee
152. See supra text accompanying note 72.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 85, 148.
154. For a description and critique of these proposals, see Burbank, supra note 8.
155. 105 S.Ct. 3012 (1985).
The Committee disagrees with the Court's decision in Marek v. Chesney, to the extent that
Rule 68, as interpreted by the Court, deprives a federal judge of the discretion to award
attorney's fees intended to be conferred by 42 U.S.C. 1988. It would be far more difficult
for any Court to reconcile the 1984 proposal [to amend Rule 68] with section 1988, but
because of the supersession provision, the attempt need not even be made.
H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 13 (1985) (footnotes omitted); see also Burbank, supra note
8, at 437-38.
156. See supra note 2.
157. See supra notes 5 & 115.
158. See H.R. RFP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1985). "Mhe experience with proposed
changes in Rule 68... demonstrates that the risk of court rules vitiating important Congressional
actions on attorney fees-especially in civil rights cases-or other issues is real." Letter from Hon.
Robert W. Kastenmeier to Senator Howell Heflin 1 (April 25, 1988) (copy available from author).
159. See 134 CONG. REc. H10,440 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) (remarks of Rep. Kastemneier)
(expressing disappointment with Senate decision to retain supersession clause).
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report in the Senate. In his remarks explaining S. 1482, however, Senator Heflin observed:
The most controversial provision of the rules enabling acts concerns
the so-called supersession clause, which is a provision in current law,
except with respect to bankruptcy rules.
Under present supersession practice, when a Federal rule conflicts
with any procedural component of a previously enacted statute, the
rule governs. If the statute has been enacted later than the rule or if
the conflict involves substantive rather than procedural rights, then the
statute governs. 16

This passage in the legislative history might be thought to support
Professor Carrington's interpretation. There may, however, be a difference-potentially a big difference-between "substantive" and "arguably
substantive" rights or laws. That aside, the passage is not a correct statement of "present supersession practice," that is, of practice under the
pre-1988 provision.1 61 Moreover, and in part for that reason, the reference to "substantive rather than procedural rights" suggests that Senator
Heflin was conflating the issues of validity and supersession and thus as-

suring his colleagues, as Professor Carrington has assured us, that "substantive rights established by Congress... cannot be abridged, enlarged,
or modified."1 62 The other side of the coin, of course, is that if a Federal
Rule is valid under the Enabling Act-the Supreme Court has never invalidated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure-there is no barrier to super-

session. Such conflation is common.1 63

Finally, a related point: the passage gives evidence of a sin akin to

that which Professor Carrington, following Walter Wheeler Cook, has
deplored.' 64 Here, however, the problem is not the assumption that
"procedure" and "substantive rights" have the same meaning when used

160. 134 CONG. REc. S16,296 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (remarks of Sen. Heflin).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50; infra note 203 and accompanying text.
162. Carrington, supra note 1, at 323.
163. See supra note 151. In a letter that was influential to the decision in the House not to insist
on the deletion of the supersession clause, see infra text accompanying note 178, Chief Justice Rehn-

quist made the same linkage, observing:
The Judicial Conference and its committees on rules have participated in the rules promulgation process for over a half century. During this time they have always been keenly
aware of the special responsibility they have in the rules process and the duty incumbent
upon them not to overreach their charter. The advisory committees should undertake to
be circumspect in superseding procedural statutes.
Letter from Hon. William H. Rehnquist to Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (Oct. 19, 1988), reprintedin
134 CONG. REc. H10,441 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988) [hereinafter cited as Rehnquist letter].
As to the factual assertions in the Chief Justice's letter, rulemaking was not committed to the "Conference and its committees" until 1958, see Pub. L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (1958) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 331 (1982)) and the rulemakers have not "always been keenly aware of... the duty incumbent upon them not to overreach their charter." See, ag., Burbank, supra note 9, at 1131-37.
164. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 284-85; infra text accompanying note 218.
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for different purposes, but that they have the same meaning to different
speakers for the same purpose. The problem arises because, as the experience with proposals to amend Rule 68 demonstrates, lawmaking often
involves a choice between policies that all would agree are procedural
(i.e., docket-clearing) and those that all would agree are substantive (i.e.,
encouraging enforcement of federal law by private plaintiffs). The view
one takes of the product of the lawmaking enterprise-is the provision
procedural or substantive?-is likely to depend on the policies that tri165
umph in the process.
I will not elaborate other objections to Professor Carrington's proposed interpretation of the supersession clause, including the objection
that it might encourage continuing neglect of the Act's basic restrictions
on court rulemaking, particularly as regards state law cases. 166 Nor will
I elaborate possible constitutional objections to the supersession clause
itself, which is hard to square with the vision of separation of powers
projected by INS v. Chadha.167 Legislation is legislation, no matter how
we choose to characterize it.168 In an age of both computerized statutes
and court rules that eschew policy choices, 169 I have yet to hear a good
argument why those rules should not be assimilated to, that is, treated
like federal common law, at least in the requirement that they respect
Congress' policy choices.1 70 Having read Professor Carrington's discussion of the "three functions" of supersession, 171 I am still waiting.
According to Professor Carrington, supersession is "functionally
linked to the requirement that rules be reported to Congress."1 72 This, of
course, is not an independent argument in favor of supersession. Moreover, there was no link at all between the supersession clause and that
requirement historically. Supersession first appeared in a bill to grant the
165. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 435-39; supra note 158. Thus, a major benefit of repeal of the
supersession clause would be to render the procedure/substance dichotomy irrelevant in the event of
inconsistency between a federal statute and a subsequently promulgated Federal Rule. Its retention
puts a greater premium on attention to the Act's basic restrictions, if not by the rulemakers, then by
Congress. See infra text accompanying note 198.
166. See infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text. More generally, Professor Carrington's interpretation, if adopted, might reinforce the erroneous interpretation of the Act's basic restrictions as
concerned with the protection of existing policy choices rather than with the allocation of power to
make policy choices. See supra text accompanying notes 16, 31.
167. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
168. See iL at 954 (footnote omitted) ("Amendment and repeal of statutes, no less than enactment, must conform with Art. I"); id. at 954 n.18, 958 n.23.
169. See Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 715.
170. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 437; Burbank, supra note 9, at 1193.
171. Carrington, supra note 1, at 322-24.
172. Id. at 322. As amended in 1988, the reporting requirement provides for a layover period of
seven months (May I to December 1), not six. Compare id. at 323 ("six-month window of time")
with Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4649 (1988) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2074).
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Court rulemaking power for actions at law in 1914;173 the reporting provision appeared ten years later in connection with the expansion of the
grant to authorize a merged system of law and equity rules.1 74 They
were thought to serve wholly distinct purposes.1 7 5 Nor is there any contemporary functional link, although Professor Carrington argues to the
contrary. As he would have it, reporting serves to alert Congress to the
potential for supersession. Without supersession, there would be no need
176
for reporting.
Reporting can "assure[ ] congressional knowledge of, and passive
acceptance of any supersession" ' 177 only if the rulemakers are scrupulous
in identifying statutory provisions that would be superseded by proposed
Federal Rules or amendments. Happily, Chief Justice Rehnquist has assured the Congress that the rulemakers will be scrupulous in the future,
an assurance that may have been essential to the passage of the 1988
legislation.1 78 The Chief Justice's assertion that such had been "generally the approach.., undertaken in the past" 179 is, however, sheer revisionism. One looks in vain for statements in the materials accompanying
the Appellate Rules 8 0 that they would have the superseding effects subsequently imputed to them in the cases cited by Professor Carrington. 8 1
More ominously, the recently circulated preliminary draft of a proposed
amendment to Rule 84 and proposed practice manual did not remark on
the inconsistency between those proposals and both 28 U.S.C. § 2072
and § 2074.182 Because knowledge of a proposed supersession may be
173. For the history and anticipated function of the supersession clause, see Burbank, supra note
9, at 1052-54.

174. For the history of and original reasons for the reporting requirement, which was written by
Chief Justice Taft, see id. at 1074-76.
175. See sources cited supra notes 173-74. Although there was an argument to be made, and
Dean Clark made it with typical tenacity, that the 1934 Enabling Act did not require the reporting
of amendments to Congress, Congress was assured that they would be reported and relied on that

assurance. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1153-54 n.601.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See Carrington, supra note I, at 322-23.
Id. at 322-23.
See Rehnquist letter, supra note 163.
Id..
180. See 9 J. MOORE & B. WARD, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE

204.01[2] (1989) (Advisory
Committee Note to FED. R. App. P. 4(a)); id. at 1239.01[2] (Advisory Committee Note to FED. R.
App. P. 39). See id. at 1 201.07 ("the Appellate Rules do not list all of the statutes that they
supersede ... Compiling such a list would have involved an arduous search of the United States
Code ...").
181. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 321-22 and cases cited in id. at 320-22 nn.250-54.
182. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15-37 (March 1989). For an analysis of the inconsistencies, see
Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (June 21, 1989)
(copy available from author).
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essential to informed public comment, it is hard to believe that the
rulemakers were simply holding back until a later stage. More likely,
they simply did not notice. The fact is that, at least in recent years, the
rulemakers have evinced a shocking ignorance of, or disregard for, statutory law. 183 Professor Carrington's article suggests his good intentions
with respect to legislation, but his treatment of the 1983 legislation
amending Rule 4184 and indeed of the 1988 legislation amending the Enabling Acts18 5 are like the stroke of the thirteenth hour, casting doubt on
all that-comes before. In any event, one individual's good intentions are
hardly a firm basis for enduring public policy.
The notion that reporting is "not necessary to protect substantive
rights established by Congress, for these cannot be abridged, enlarged or
modified" 18 6 at least has historical lineage, however dubious, 1 7 but it is
hardly what one would expect from a follower of Walter Wheeler Cook.
Again, notwithstanding the assurances given to Congress in 1938 that the
Court would be "zealous to correct [a] mistake, if any has been made,"18 8
the Court has never invalidated a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Even
the Court now acknowledges that some of its work, notably the 1966
The proposed amendment to Rule 84 would thus grant power to the Judicial Conference
that it does not currently possess, to wit, the power to promulgate new or amended Administrative Rules. In that aspect, the proposed rule would partially supersede § 2072, substituting the Conference for the Court, and § 2074, dispensing with submission to Congress.
Moreover, by reason of Rule 84, such Administrative Rules would have the effect of superseding inconsistent local rules .... I have serious doubts whether such a grant of rulemaking power can be accomplished by Federal Rule.
Id. at 3. See also id. at 4 ("At the least, [the Conference] should honor the Chief Justice's assurance
that, in proposing Federal Rules that would supersede Acts of Congress, the rulemakers 'will undertake to identify such situations when they arise .... ' ").
The proposals have since been "referred to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules for further
study and consultation with Circuit Executives in light of the comments received from a number of
district judges and members of the bar." Letter from Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr. to Hon. Robert W.
Kastenmeier (Aug. 21, 1989) (copy available from author).
183. See, eg., Burbank, supra note 127, at 1003-04 (in amending Rule 11, rulemakers proceeded
in apparent ignorance of congressional concern about impact of sanctions on attorneys' effective
representation, expressed when Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1927); 128 CONG. REc. 30,930-31
(1982) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (asserting failure of proposed amendment to Rule 4 to achieve its
purpose in light of statutes).
184. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 111-45, 156-65.
186. Carrington, supra note 1, at 323; see supra text accompanying note 162.
187. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1137 (footnotes omitted):
In various public pronouncements during the drafting of the Rules and their consideration
by Congress, members of the Advisory Committee assured their audiences that the task of
observing the procedure/substance dichotomy had proved not very difficult. The truth,
however, was that, having failed to address the problem at all systematically, the Committee was forced, and in most cases was quite content, to rely largely on judgments informed
by a sense of the professional and political climate and by the hope that the Supreme Court
would preserve it from error.
See also id. at 1134-35 n.530.
188. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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amendments to Rule 23, has been "substantive ...in the sense that the

rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants," 18 9 and for years many scholars have regarded the reporting pro-

vision as an important check on overreaching. 190 So, indeed, has the
Court itself. 191 The Enabling Act, both in 1934 and today, protects not
only substantive rights that have been "established by Congress." It protects Congress's power to decide whether there shall be prospective federal law in a given area. If Congress decides not to act in that area, the

Enabling Act protects rights that have been, as well as rights that might
be, conferred by state law. 192 As Professor Carrington acknowledges,

supersession is irrelevant with respect to state law. 193 Although it is
heartening that he recognizes at least some of the Enabling Act's implications for separation of powers, we should not forget either that federalism
has dominated debates about rulemaking power for the last fifty years or
that federalism remains a concern, even if only derivatively. t94 Under

Professor Carrington's view of the reporting requirement, who would
watch the watchmen when the concern was the inappropriate displacement of state law?

The possibility of supersession may furnish an additional "inducement" to those who "perceive that their substantive interests are
threatened by a proposed amendment, to marshal their political resources for self-protection."' 195 But neither the part of our legal land-

scape occupied by federal as opposed to state law, the appearance of
political neutrality that Professor Carrington so values in Federal

Rules, 19 6 nor the rulemakers' track-record in alerting interested parties
189. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S.Ct. 647, 665 (1989) (footnote omitted) ("[T]his Court's
rulemaking under the enabling acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the rules of

procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants."); see also id. at 665 n,19
(describing the controversy surrounding Rule 23). So much for "incidental effects." See Carrington,
supra note 1, at 298-99; supra note 37.
190. See, eg., W. BROWN, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES 86-96
(1981) (noting that the negative aspects of congressional review might be avoided by a closer relationship between the judicial and legislative branches in the drafting and revision processes). By no
means, however, is it a sufficient check. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1196 & n.779 ("[Tihe congressional review mechanism ... is an imperfect instrument for the protection of rights and interests
far removed from the domain of procedural expertise.").
191. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965); see also Burlington N.R.R. v. Woods, 480
U.S. 1, 6 (1987) (reporting requirement cited as one basis for "presumptive validity" of proposed
Federal Rules); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1941) (congressional examination of
proposed rules and laws is frequently employed to make sure action "squares with the Congressional
purpose"); Burbank, Rules and Discretion, supra note 13, at 700 & n.53; supra note 54.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.

193.
194.
195.
196.

See Carrington, supra note I, at 322.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-49; supra note 40; Burbank, supra note 9, at 1187.
Carrington, supra note 1, at 323.
See id. at 301-02.
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to the possibility of supersession 197 suggests that it is of much practical
importance in that regard. Moreover, the argument is not what one
would expect from one who has asserted both that reporting is not necessary to protect substantive rights, and that "arguably substantive" statutes are not subject to supersession.
In the absence of serious and sustained attention to the Enabling
Act's limitations by the rulemakers and the Court, reporting remains "an
important check on overreaching."'1 98 It would remain important even if
there were no supersession clause, if only because existing congressional
statutes embody only some of the substantive rights protected by those
limitations. Far from providing "focus for congressional review," 1 99 the
supersession clause increases the pressure on Congress to delay or defeat
the effectiveness of proposed Federal Rules reported to it and thus makes
it harder for Congress to achieve an important goal of the 1988 amendments to the Enabling Acts: "prevent[ing] controversy of the sort that
has plagued federal supervisory court rulemaking in recent years."'2°°
Professor Carrington's second functional justification of supersession is on sounder ground historically, but it rests on questionable factual
and theoretical premises. According to that justification, supersession
permits the rulemaking process to "clear away from the timbers of important and enduring federal legislation the undergrowth of procedural
marginalia that have been attached to legislation for faded or forgotten
reasons. '20 1 And, according to Professor Carrington, it does so only
with "notice to Congress" and only with respect to "matters of 'practice
'20 2
and procedure' having no substantive consequences.
In effect, Professor Carrington identifies as "political" only that which is recognized as of
interest by some coherent (and, apparently, wholly self-interested) group. According to
this view, "neutrality" means "reduc[ing] the level of political interest in procedural rules."
And according to this view, both substance-specific procedures and empirical investigation
of supposedly neutral rules are anathema: the former because they will be likely to attract
rather than "deflect political attention" and the latter because data on experience under the
Rules may cause organized groups to realize that they have a stake and hence to regard the
"neutral" rule as a legitimate object of political interest.
Burbank, Transformation,supra note 13, at 1936-37 (footnotes omitted).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 177-85.
198. See supra text accompanying note 190.
199. Carrington, supra note 1, at 323.
200. H.R. RaP. No. 422, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 22 (1985); see also id. at 13. "[T]he mere existence of the supersession clause has been a factor that has motivated the Congress---especially the
House-to intervene more than 20 times in the past to delay the effective date or to reject proposed
rules." Letter from Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier to Senator Howell Heflin, supra note 158, at 1.
If the Supreme Court follows Professor Carrington's lead in ignoring the legislative attempt to
confine the Court's supervisory rulemaking power, the goal of avoiding controversy is doomed both
when supersession is implicated and when it is not. See Burbank, supra note 9, at 1195-96; supra
note 165.
201. Carrington, supra note 1, at 324.
202. Id..
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As originally formulated, the supersession clause was intended to

"cear... undergrowth," although it was by no means limited to "proce-

dural marginalia. ' 20 3 Nor is it so limited today, even if Professor Carrington could persuade the courts to adopt his novel interpretation of the

supersession clause and read "[a]ll laws" to mean "all laws that are not
'arguably substantive.' "o204 Failing that, a valid Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure will supersede even a statutory provision that Members of
Congress regard as conferring a substantive right. 20 5 Congress may not
receive notice of the potential for supersession. If it does receive notice,
there will be additional pressure to intervene, because, apart from the

ineffectiveness of judicial review for consistency with the Enabling Act,
on this hypothesis only Congress can prevent supersession.
The notion that, in 1989, the statutory provisions at risk of superses-

sion consist primarily of "procedural marginalia" is, in any event, hard
to accept. Congress conducted a general ground-clearing operation when
it revised the Judicial Code in 1948,206 and the examples of supersession
adduced by Professor Carrington are telling precisely because they involve Federal Rules that did not come into effect until 1968.207 If, as the

Supreme Court has assured us, Congress legislates against the back-

20 8
ground of Federal Rules and does not lightly seek their displacement,
203. As one example, a major purpose of the supersession clause was to free the federal courts
from the obligation to apply state law imposed by the Conformity Act of 1872. See Burbank, supra
note 9, at 1052-54; supra text accompanying note 17. As another, the original Advisory Committee
apparently hoped that original Rule 83 would both "abolish" any vestiges of the Conformity Act
and supersede the requirement, see 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1982), that local rules of court be consistent
with federal statutes. See Letter from William D. Mitchell to Charles E. Clark (Oct. 13, 1937)
(Clark Papers, Sterling Library of Yale University, box 111, folder 58); Letter from Stephen B.
Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 4-5 (Feb. 27, 1984), reprinted in 1985
Hearing,supra note *, at 27-28. The latter goal was not achieved. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 161 n.18 (1973). The examples can be multiplied simply by reviewing the Advisory Committee's Notes to the 1938 Rules, specifying some of the statutes superseded or partially superseded.
The effects on existing statutes of original Rule 4(f) (territorial limits of effective service), Rule 25
(substitution of parties), and Rule 43 (evidence) are of particular interest. See Burbank, supra note
9, at 1172-73 n.673 (Rule 4(f)), 1155-57 (Rule 25), and 1137-43 (Rule 43).
204. See supra text accompanying notes 149-65. The statutes that would have been partially
superseded by the recently proposed amendment to Rule 84 and proposed practice manual, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2074 (1982 & Supp. V 1988), are hardly "procedural marginalia." See supra text
accompanying note 182.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 158, 163-65.
206. Letter from the Hon. Edward T. Gignoux to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier 1 (Sept. 24,
1985), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1985); see also id. at 23..
207. See Carrington, supra note 1, at 322 (citing "the extension of time for appeal, the taxability
of printing costs, and proctors' fees in admiralty appeals" as examples); supra text accompanying
notes 180-81.
208. See, eg., Califano v. Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 698-701 (1979) (ruling that, in the absence of
clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary, availability of class relief under statute
should be governed by Rule 23); see also Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000, 1006-11 (D.C.
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there should be very few statutory provisions remaining that are inconsistent with Federal Rules. And if so, it is hard to understand why Congress' stated reason for repealing the supersession clause for Bankruptcy
Rules in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978209 is not generally applicable. As explained in the Senate Report: "This bill extensively revises the
bankruptcy law. Nearly all procedural matters have been removed and
left to the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Consequently, the need to
permit the Supreme Court's rules to supersede the statute no longer ex'210
ists. To the extent a rule is inconsistent, the statute will govern.
If the Court is right about Congress's general attitude, those few
cases where supersession remains possible are likely to involve inconsistency resulting from an advertent exercise of policy judgment by Congress in the face of a contrary policy judgment by the rulemakers. In this
context, the question of supersession is whether the rulemakers should be
able to come back with a rule reasserting their policy preference, or asserting a wholly new policy preference, and thus require Congress again
to pass, and the President again to sign, legislation in order to prevail.
Professor Carrington praises supersession as "contribut[ing] over time to
the maintenance of rules that are general and a rulemaking process that
is appropriately neutral." 2 11 Implementing the work of one who advocates a "veil of ignorance" 2 12 that would shield the rulemakers from the
possible substantive side effects of their rules, the supersession clause also
deprives Congress of the ability to respond, discretely and effectively, to
proof of disproportionate substantive impact-and all in the service of
rules whose uniformity, trans-substantivity, simplicity, and predictability
2 13
are a mirage.
Professor Carrington's final functional justification of supersession is
that it "signiflies] one aspect of the relationship between Congress and
the federal courts as co-equal branches of the government." 2 14 As that
Cir. 1986) (nothing in Magnuson-Moss Act compelled trial court to "bend the requirements of Rule
23"), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 915 (1987).
209. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 247, 92 Stat. 2549, 2672 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2075
(1982)). The 1988 legislation did not alter these arrangements.
210. S.REP.No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1978); see also H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 292-93 (1978) ("[Tihe Rules would no longer create confusion if they are inconsistent with
the statute, and the Supreme Court will lose the power to repealpro tanto portions of the bankruptcy

laws.").
211. Carrington, supra note 1, at 324.
212. Carrington, Bogy, supra note 3, at 2079. For criticism of this proposed normative posture
for rulemakers, see Burbank, Transformation, supra note 13, at 1940-41.
213. See Burbank, Transformation, supra note 13, at 1929-43. I am assuming that Professor
Carrington's unique interpretation of the clause will not be adopted. See supra text accompanying
notes 149-55.
214. Carrington, supra note 1, at 324.
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justification may suggest, the view one takes of supersession may ultimately depend on the value one places on symbols. I am uncomfortable
with the messages conveyed by the supersession clause, but it at least
once served a useful purpose. 2 15 Today, as I have suggested, one message
may be that notwithstanding the Chief Justice's reassuring words, the
rulemakers need not be concerned about Congress's policy choices as
they go about their work.2 16 A far more troublesome message is that the
policy preferences of judges and their advisers, acting in a legislative capacity but without popular mandate or all of the restraining influences of
the legislative process, are entitled to supremacy when they conflict with
the policy preferences of the people's representatives. Whether or not the
supersession clause is consistent with the formal requirements of the
Constitution, it is not, at least for me, consistent with the vision of a
democratic society that inspires that document.
History alone does not permit us to assume that future Reporters
will share Professor Carrington's qualities. Those qualities, however,
have already served the rulemaking process well. We can only hope that
in shaping the procedure of the twenty-first century even greater attention will be paid to the concern that, if the rulemakers are left to make
choices as to matters that are rationally capable of classification as either
procedure or substance, "they will choose to advance those policies that
are their special province and to subordinate those that are not. '2 17 Perhaps that hope too is wishful thinking, but with me it has "all the tenacity of original sin."2 18

215. See supra text accompanying note 203.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 178-85.
217. Burbank, supra note 9, at 1191-92.
218. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 337 (1933).
See Carrington, supra note 1, at 285.

